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ABSTRACT: Science communication in practice and as a field of research occurs within a social context 
characterized by multiple forms of diversity. In light of this and the emergence of social justice as an increasingly 
recognized criteria for ethical practice, this essay asks the question whether there is a role for social justice in 
science communication and, if so, on what basis and what it would require from the field. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of social justice has emerged in the bioethics field as among the fundamental 
considerations of ethical outcomes, particularly in the biomedical field. This was partially in 
response to the widely-regarded “Georgetown mantra” or the “Four Principles”—on-
maleficence, beneficence, respect for persons, and justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001)—
which essentially revolved around the interests of individuals rather than communities or other 
collectives. After decades of mounting dissatisfaction with the Four Principles, the concept of 
social justice has emerged as among the core principles increasingly applied to evaluate the 
ethical nature of a particular practice or activity. Essentially, social justice, based on principles 
of equity and fairness, seeks to establish principles of fairness as applied within a given 
society. Consequently, such issues as distributive justice, fair access, and voice shift to the 
forefront.  
 While criteria such as truth, honesty, and engagement are frequently invoked in 
discussions of science communication (Bucchi & Trench, 2012), the increasingly pluralistic 
nature of societies gives rise to the question of whether the societal circumstances and 
demographics call for a reconsideration of appropriate goals of science communication. 
Indeed, the appropriate goals and methods of science communication in various contexts are 
increasingly considered by scholars in the field (Nordmann, 2011). Given that science 
communication in practice and as a field of research, by definition, addresses how science is 
communicated to the public, it would seem critical to consider how or by what metric or 
criteria fulfillment of this role can be evaluated. Moreover, in light of the phenomenon of 
diverse societies and the emergence of social justice as an increasingly recognized criteria for 
ethical practice, the question may be asked whether there is a role for social justice in science 
communication and, if so, on what basis, and perhaps most importantly, what it would require 
from the field.  
 There are two primary tensions that initially present themselves in considering whether 
there is a role for social justice in science communication. First, science communication can be 
seen as a descriptive enterprise, aiming to convey “what is.” In contrast, social justice is 
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fundamentally a normative concept, offering a prescription of “what ought to be,” e.g., how a 
society should function. While striving for truth, objectivity, and neutrality from what arguably 
have come to be foundational cornerstones of science communication, even as we might 
acknowledge a certain degree of bias inherent in both the practice and research of science 
communication, this question requires that we query whether these core principles preclude a 
role for social justice in science communication. This work explores this tension between the 
two and examines whether science communication as a field or practice can accommodate, and 
perhaps even embrace, a role for social justice.  
2. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
The term “social justice” has been understood to encompass a range of considerations, all of 
which generally identify the need to ensure that people are treated fairly and equitably. While a 
precise definition of social justice that meets with universal agreement remains evasive, core 
elements of fairness and well-being are to be found in each of them. Indeed, it has been 
explicitly acknowledged that not all liberties and freedoms are on equal moral par and, 
therefore, do not merit the same level of regard and protection in public policy (Faden & 
Powers, 2011).  Faden and Powers (2011) specifically concern themselves with social 
structures and the improvement of health in what they refer to as the “twin aims” of social 
justice—1) the improvement of human well-being and 2) combatting (by prevention or 
amelioration) the adverse effects on well-being caused by systematic disadvantage. Thus, if we 
loosely adopt this framework for the concept of social justice and apply it to science 
communication, the result might look something like the following: the role of social justice in 
science communication would consider, within the framework of the interaction between 
science and society, social structures with the aims of 1) exploring how scientific advances 
affect human well-being and 2) contributing to the prevention or amelioration of adverse 
effects on well-being that are caused by systematic disadvantage.  
 Thus, at first glance, minor adaptations to the aims of social justice articulated by Faden 
and Powers (2011) as applied to science communication would suggest that this field, if it were 
to embrace a role for social justice, may be required to abandon some of its foundational 
principles of neutrality and objectivity, thereby affecting its primarily descriptive nature. 
Would a departure from the descriptive orientation of science communication be required in 
order to incorporate principles of social justice? Or might it be the case that some normative 
concepts actually resonate with the essential nature of science communication? 
3. TENSION BETWEEN SCIENCE COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE? 
Science communication is understood to refer to fields of professional practice, e.g., science 
journalism as well as to an interdisciplinary field of study (Priest, 2010). In 2003, Burns, 
O’Connor, and Stocklmeyer, seeking to identify an accurate and sufficiently inclusive 
definition, developed a “contemporary definition” of science communication based on 
surveying the field, its practices and practitioners, and its usage. After analysis of usage, the 
authors concluded that science communication can be defined as “the use of appropriate skills, 
media, activities, and dialogue to produce one or more of the following personal responses to 
science: Awareness, Enjoyment, Interest, Opinion-forming, and Understanding” (Burns, 
O’Connor, & Stocklmeyer, 2003). While this expansive definition does little to narrow the 
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focus of inquiry here, it does highlight some key features of the field of science 
communication, both as a professional practice and as a field of academic inquiry.  Perhaps 
most prominently, this surveyed definition highlights the intermediary aspect of science 
communication that might underscore an allegiance to truth and objectivity.  
 Given the intermediary status and the role of analyzing issues in the interaction 
between science and society in the case of academic study, and “bringing” science to society in 
the case of professional practice, a core principle of truth and, at least some degree of, 
objectivity would seem essential to being effective in this field. As such, the concern with 
descriptive accuracy and less so with normative approaches is logical. And, indeed, it is fair to 
say that science communication has been most fundamentally concerned with accurate 
coverage of “what is” and not with “what ought to be.” This conscious engagement with 
accuracy in the descriptive coverage and portrayal of science lends to a view that (non-self-
interested) science communicators (to exclude in this instance consideration of private 
enterprise, e.g., industry PR) aim for a high degree of objectivity and truth in the practice of 
their craft, whether academic inquiry or journalism. Given this, it would seem that normative 
aims and approaches could be an inappropriate match for the intermediary role of science 
communication, which arguably gains some of its credibility from its objectivity.  
 The field of science communication lavishes in an abundance of meanings (Miller, 
1983; Burns, O’Connor, & Stocklmeyer, 2003). But, as the core principles of truth, objectivity, 
and neutrality (which naturally attend a role of intermediary) suggest, any incorporation of 
normative principles such as social justice, which declare unashamedly what ought to be, 
would seem to be crisply at odds with the goals and practice of science communication. But is 
this tension inevitable? Is it irreconcilable? Does it lead necessarily to an amoral practice of 
science communication? Scientifically sound, but at times unproblematically without ethical 
regard? The next section explores these questions, first asking whether this tension between 
science communication as a descriptive enterprise and social justice as a normative concept is 
inevitable.  
 A key aspect of evaluating whether there is an inherent tension between science 
communication and a role for social justice is getting a handle on a sufficiently acceptable 
definition of “science communication,” a definition that encompasses the core features of the 
field as it is understood by those who practice it and who recognize those who practice it.  The 
combined definitions developed by Priest and Burns, et al, supra,  can ground this analysis 
sufficiently  to explore whether the field is inherently  resistant to social justice or merely 
indifferent.  
3.1 Why Social Justice? 
A more fundamental issue resides in the query itself. Are there not other normative candidates 
for special regard in this field? Arguably, both the nature and the field suggest a response. 
While respect for persons and the like may call science communication practitioners to correct 
behavior toward individuals, the greater impact of the enterprise goes without regard. Thus, 
just as in the field of health and biomedical ethics, regard for concerns beyond (not instead of) 
individualistic ones became increasingly compelling as the consequences of “fair” policies 
were repeatedly shown to have negative or disparate impacts on particular segments of the 
population. Fairness to individuals in traditional forms simply did not always lead to fair 
results. Whether consent is meaningful and therefore ethically defensible, for example in the 
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context of experimental treatment, can hinge substantially on existing social factors like 
education level and income. If someone has not had access to educational opportunities nor has 
no other means to obtain “treatment,” the use of “consent” may be as indefensible as a 
complete lack thereof. A claim that consent procedure was conducted with everyone before 
experimenting on them may be decidedly unfair if some of those asked for consent did not or 
could not understand or appreciate the nature and risks of their participation in the study.  
 This inspires the question of whether and how the practice or research field of science 
communication ever operates within or intersects with a context of systematic disadvantage or 
its consequences, for example regarding access and voice. And, if so, is the intersection 
between the two such that it warrants active consideration? To answer this, we must look 
closely at 1) what social justice might concretely require of science communication and 2) 
whether science communication, as a discipline, can embrace social justice as an aim and still 
maintain core elements essential to its integrity and, hence, credibility. In the following section 
I explore what social justice might demand of science communication.   
3.2 Scope of Social Justice 
There is no single unifying definition of social justice, yet certain core principles have been 
identified that point to considerations of fairness and equitable treatment linked to a concern 
with well-being. However, as pointed out, the call of social justice aims for a wider regard. 
Bioethicists Ruth Faden and Madison Powers (2011) have developed a view of social justice 
that uses a twin-aims approach that establishes both a positive goal of improving well-being 
and a negative goal of preventing or ameliorating adverse effects caused by systematic 
disadvantage.   
 Social justice is justified as criteria in part because of the nature of the application to 
which Faden and Powers (2011) direct it, namely health. One of the key justifications for 
imposing a requirement of social justice is that health is considered a “special good” (Anand, 
2002). That is, there is something uniquely foundational about health as it pertains to human 
well-being. Indeed, as is frequently pointed out, health is essential to the pursuit of virtually all 
other rights and freedoms and is generally viewed as essential to human flourishing. But does 
social justice stand on such compelling ground when viewed in the context of science 
communication?  
3.3 Does the Field of Science Communication Involve a “Special Good? 
Is there a component or aspect of science communication that holds claim to a “special good” 
(Anand, 2002)?  Is there a claim to something in the world of science communication that is 
fundamental to the capacity for human flourishing and, as such, merits special regard and 
protection? Does the field involve or affect a “good” that every human being “could be 
presumed to want” (that would be necessary to the capacity for human flourishing)? What 
would constitute “goods” that might be implicated in the field of science communication? One 
could make the argument that various forms of science literacy—science education, 
understanding, awareness, or even entertainment—constitute “goods.” However, whether any 
of these reach the level of “special good” requires a closer look.  
 If we understand science communication, both as practice and field of research, in its 
many guises, aims to present, explain, and engage people with science, it may not be obvious 
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that science presents a compelling example of an essential good necessary to a capacity for 
human flourishing, certainly not in the way that health does. (But this characterization of health 
goes beyond the criteria of special good and is argued by many to be more rightly placed in the 
category of fundamental right, thus justifying such policy measures as universal health care.) 
But a good that is essential to the capacity for human flourishing may be a higher hurdle to 
cross for scientific literacy. On the other hand, science—engaging with it, utilizing it, 
participating in it, participating in its benefits, protecting oneself from its negative effects, and 
so forth—may actually turn out to be essential to the capacity to flourish in modern society, 
particularly if these consequences are tagged in any way to systematic disadvantage.  
 Two examples may illustrate how access to science may be implicated in the capacity 
for human flourishing. In short, I suggest that the connection between the two may be found in 
1) capacity for informed decision making (agency and self-determination) leading to 
empowerment and 2) participation in political life, both of which are found in some variation 
in definitions of human flourishing. An example of the importance of informed decision 
making can be found in the case of Henrietta Lacks. By now, thanks to Rebecca Skloot’s 
(2001) The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, the story of Henrietta Lacks is well-known. Cells 
were taken from the person and body of Henrietta Lack in Baltimore, Maryland without her 
knowledge or consent and delivered around the world as HeLa cells, leading to a multitude of 
biomedical breakthroughs, including polio vaccine and cancer treatments. Poor and from a 
systematically disadvantaged ethnic group, Henrietta Lacks was in no position to champion her 
interests or rights. This had consequences not only for herself but also for her family/children. 
The removal of the tissue from her cervix was neither part of her clinical care nor a voluntary 
donation. The point here is not only about lack of consent, but also about the compound effects 
of systematic disadvantage. Consider, for example, the case of Moore v. the Regents of 
California in 1990, also a case where diseased tissue samples were taken without consent. In 
this case, had consent been sought, scientific literacy could have reasonably been expected to 
alert Moore to the commercial implications from the use and patenting of his tissue. Moreover, 
once alerted to the unauthorized commercial use of his tissue, he possessed the wherewithal to 
bring a lawsuit, something that one could speculate would not have been the case with 
Henrietta Lacks and her family. Clearly, the case of Lacks differs in some important respects 
from the consent not given in the case of Moore, partially rooted in systematic disadvantage, 
the concern of the second of social justice’s twin aims. In essence, Henrietta Lacks was treated 
instrumentally as a non-participant in decisions that affected her, contrary to the agency and 
self-determination fundamental to the concept of human flourishing.  
 An example of the second aspect of scientific literacy via science communication—
participation in political life—as a “special good” can be found on the occasion of the 
introduction and adoption of voluntary and forensic DNA databanks. These databanks collect 
and store genetic information of persons convicted of crimes, and in some jurisdictions, those 
arrested and even those who are merely detained, e.g., for a stop light violation. For members 
of the public who are completely unaware of the nature of information that can be gained from 
DNA, scientific claims that DNA will solve crimes, exonerate people, and identify criminals is 
one that may have tremendous appeal as it can be used to make streets and communities safer 
by increasing the chances of identifying and capturing the bad guys. However, what is not 
apparent to those who do not have an understanding or appreciation of the range of information 
that can be gained from DNA or how it may be used, is that this claimed increase in the 
likelihood of capturing criminals comes at considerable cost to privacy and possibly even 
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dignity, not to mention equality. State measures to create forensic DNA databanks from 
compulsory specimens taken from people who are arrested or merely detained hold enormous 
consequences that may not be appreciated by those without scientific literacy. Thus, public 
consultations and legislative lobbying and debate are more likely to remain outside the reach of 
those who do not understand or appreciate the consequences of DNA collection and storage in 
a forensic database. Moreover, to the extent that arrests and detainments disproportionately 
befall certain ethnic or racial groups, the impact also rides on the back of systematic 
disadvantage and affects these populations disproportionately both in the initial intake of 
genetic information and in the representational slant or bias in the database. Participation in the 
political process is affected by both science literacy and the abilities to engage with the 
relevant issues and to appreciate the consequences. 
 An argument that access to scientific literacy is a sort of “special good” might be based 
upon a claim that participation in political life and informed decision making about important 
matters pertaining to oneself (self-determination) are necessary to a capacity for human 
flourishing in certain democratic societies and that scientific literacy is a core component of the 
capacity for self-determination/agency and participation in political life. Philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum (2003) has observed that human flourishing invariably includes the ability to 
participate in political life as well as the ability to be “self-governing.” Thus one important 
question is whether scientific literacy, just as access to education, can be said to be necessary 
to these aspects of human flourishing. Moreover, if we consider how a lack of these “goods,” 
e.g. health, or lack of scientific literacy perpetrates and perpetuates a limiting effect on the 
capacity for flourishing, the connection becomes more apparent. Indeed, scientific literacy is a 
special category of education and may even simply be included within that already existing 
framework. But even if we can attach science communication to a “special good,” can the 
contours of effective science communication, either as a field of research or professional 
practice, accommodate and embrace a normative framework such as social justice?  
4. WHAT WOULD SOCIAL JUSTICE DEMAND OF SCIENCE COMMUNICATION?  
If the case can be made that science communication involves access to a sort of “special good,” 
perhaps most persuasively as a critical component of education, and therefore merits regard 
through a social justice lens, then the next question is what would be required of the practice or 
field of science communication as a practical matter. If science communication is situated 
within the domain of social justice, what, then, are the obligations of the field with regard to 
this principle? 
 To answer this key question it is necessary to consider both the goals of social justice 
and the mechanisms that can be employed in a particular domain in order to achieve those 
goals. Thus, adopting a variation of the twin aims of Faden and Powers (2011), we would need 
to identify mechanisms within science communication that would 1) improve the well-being of 
people and 2) prevent or ameliorate adverse effects caused by systematic disadvantage. As the 
two examples given above show, there is ample reason to believe that the field of science 
communication carries mechanisms that have the potential to contribute to these two aims.  
 What kind of mechanisms within the field or domain of science communication could 
achieve the positive goal of improving the well-being of people? Perhaps the most important 
and most critical aspect of science communication with regard to the improvement of well-
being is its empowering capacity. That is, what science communication delivers in terms of 
A ROLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SCIENCE COMMUNICATION?  
201 
scientific literacy, awareness, and understanding of science serves to empower people in ways 
that improve well-being. Among the ways that this type of empowerment improves well-being 
include enhanced capacity for agency and self-determination, informed decision making about 
matters that affect oneself, and enhanced capacity to exercise scrutiny in matters affected by 
science, e.g., effects of sugar consumption, biodegradability of products, or products using 
animal testing, if these are matters that are important to someone. These examples all address a 
core aspect of agency—that one should be able to live a life that is consistent with one’s beliefs 
and values (Dworkin, 1986). In order to do this, it requires that one be aware of the extent to 
which certain choices (in their scientific nature) are consistent with one’s beliefs and values. 
Consequently, a belief that animals should not be mistreated or used merely instrumentally 
could preclude the conscious use of products tested on animals. However, if an individual 
holding that view is not aware that such a practice is used for some products and not in others, 
he or she misses the opportunity (or according to Dworkin, the responsibility) to behave in 
ways that are consistent with one’s beliefs and values and together create a coherence to one’s 
life.  
 Many examples can be found in biomedical science. Communication of biomedical 
advances or discoveries empowers people to act accordingly, whether to take advantage of or 
avoid certain behaviors that affect physical or mental well-being. But a more nuanced look 
would also point beyond the mere communication of reported advances or discoveries and 
might look at who is affected by these advances and how “beneficial” advances or discoveries 
can be made available either to those who most need them or would most benefit by them. For 
example, studies showing effective risk-prevention strategies for avoiding or delaying 
dementia could warrant either targeting communication to certain segments of the population 
or ensuring coverage, address, or analysis of the pros and cons of these strategies (particularly 
if they involve cost or risk) could serve the ends of social justice.  
 In the realm of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), depending on how and where 
an individual is situated within the field of science communication, embrace of social justice 
could involve traditional communication strategies such as media coverage of possibilities 
made available by such scientific developments. To the extent that knowledge and 
understanding about PGD empowers people in ways that enhance well-being, e.g., via 
promoting agency, then such measures perhaps can be said to embrace the first twin aim of 
social justice. But in this example, the question must be asked in what way people are actually 
empowered such that it enhances well-being. A knee-jerk response might turn to those who 
want to avoid repeat of a birth to a child with a severe disability or to save the life of an 
existing child by giving birth to a “savior sibling,” one whose blood type, etc., is suitable for 
life-saving organ or tissue transplantation. This, however, may not be the only nor necessarily 
the best or most accurate interpretation of “empowerment.” Indeed, since what is possibly the 
most compelling and most powerful form of empowerment is the ability to make well-
informed decisions regarding matters that affect oneself, a sound understanding of PGD and its 
implications could lead an individual to reject the use of PGD as being inconsistent with one’s 
values and beliefs both for him or herself and for the society in which he or she lives. So, on 
the one hand, an adequate understanding of PGD and its implications presents as an 
empowering mechanism that places certain choices in the hands of those wishing to benefit 
from it and who accept its implications, moral and otherwise. And on the other hand, such 
literacy empowers one to reject the use of the technology based on an understanding of what it 
entails and its implications. The empowerment is toward the capacity to live a life according to 
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one’s views and principles. However, what this also points to is the need not only to 
communicate about the science itself, but also about the implications, impacts, or side effects.  
 One could look beyond biomedical applications to include such scientifically facilitated 
developments as labeling or consumption of GM crops, the development of alternative energy 
sources, biorenewable energy, or biofuels. Some of these possible options hinge substantially 
on the scientific method employed to acquire these resources. Given the lack of consensus 
about the acceptability of the underlying science, methods, or resulting products, public debate 
is expected to or has played an important role in societal approach to uptake and incorporation. 
However, in such debates only the scientifically well-informed are equipped to participate 
knowledgeably in the public debate and resulting policy approaches.  
 The second of the twin aims of social justice, to combat adverse effects on well-being 
of systematic disadvantage, is perhaps the most controversial for the field and practice of 
science communication. Although in some respects it is merely the flipside of the first twin 
aim, it does, in fact, carry other implications. Indeed, the aim to combat adverse effects caused 
by systematic disadvantage points directly to an affirmative duty to, at the very least, remain 
vigilant in the practice of science communication to the effects of science on populations, 
groups, and communities who live in circumstances at least partially characterized by 
systematic disadvantage.   
 I suggest that these additional considerations highlighted by social justice may be 
categorized in the context of science communication in terms of 1) context, 2) impact, and 3) 
implications.  Given that social justice requires efforts in prevention of adverse effects caused 
by systematic disadvantage, it would seem insufficient to communicate merely the science as a 
purely factual matter (for practice) or examine it as an a-contextual phenomenon. Rather the 
scientific facts would need to be placed in context. That is, engaging in science communication 
would require some acknowledgement of the context in which the science is conducted or 
applied. To illustrate this, consider the example of the forensic DNA databases. It may not be 
enough to explain or discuss how a DNA database works and what it achieves. In order to 
prevent adverse effects caused by systematic disadvantage, there may well be a need to discuss 
the context in which such databases are used—in a society or state where the legacy of 
discrimination (systematic disadvantage) results in disproportionate arrests and detention and, 
consequently, an overrepresentation in the DNA database. Such an expanded view of the role 
of science communication addresses the first aim in that by communicating about context, a 
likely affected population can become empowered to participate in the political process when it 
is clear that the results of that process will have an impact on them. Furthermore, awareness 
and understanding of the context of a particular science can facilitate and enhance agency and 
self-determination in that it alerts individuals to possible impacts and allows them to become 
actors rather than the “acted upon.” 
 The second type of duty that social justice might impose on science communication 
regards impact. Impact can be understood to refer to the effects that a particular scientific 
development or application would have on people, most particularly impacts that show some 
possibility or probability toward adverse effects on well-being caused by systematic 
disadvantage. The forensic DNA database again provides an example of such a topic as a focus 
of science communication. The impact of a seemingly neutral biotechnological application has 
a particular impact on communities of color that may be characterized as adverse in nature. Of 
course, there are stories of hard-fought exoneration attributable to genetic information. Another 
example of impact that social justice may demand that the practice of science communication 
A ROLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SCIENCE COMMUNICATION?  
203 
address is over-the-counter (OTC) genetic testing. These tests, which can be ordered by anyone 
via the Internet, can profile various types of genetic profiles, including risks of certain cancers 
and other diseases, as well as ancestry. The impact of these clinical and “recreational” genetic 
tests on the well-being of persons who lack scientific literacy could be substantial.  An absence 
of a particular disease mutation can be taken to mean no risk just as the presence of a particular 
disease mutation can signal a death toll for the scientifically illiterate. The call to prevent or 
ameliorate adverse effects on well-being could require the provision of targeted information 
and engagement with low SES communities.  
 The third category of implications of the science as a social justice-mandated feature of 
science communication relates to implications, but takes it further to both the individual and 
collective consequences of the conduct or application of the science. To illustrate this, consider 
the example of research on early detection of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). There is wide 
consensus in the AD research community that the pathology of AD begins over a decade 
before the onset of symptoms . Given the mantra of health care—that early intervention leads 
to better outcomes—the push to intervene in Alzheimer’s earlier and earlier in the disease 
progression has become the hallmark of Alzheimer’s disease research. Efforts to treat 
symptomatic Alzheimer’s has delivered very few indications of any success, and 
pharmaceutical clinical trials have produced only the rare negligible success. Meanwhile, amid 
concerns that researchers are missing the “therapeutic window,” researchers have made 
enormous advances in the ability to detect Alzheimer’s pathology earlier and earlier in the 
disease progression (Pierce, 2010). PET scans are now able to capture structural changes in the 
brain indicative of AD (and distinguishable from other forms of dementia) (Klunk, et al., 
2004). MRI is now able to identify the build-up of amyloid plaques characteristic of AD (even 
pre-symptomatically) (Seshadri, 2010). As well, biochemical markers in cerebral spinal fluid 
(CSF) also may indicate pre-symptomatic Alzheimer’s. The science news carried these stories 
with the appropriate reverence for advances in tackling this, one of the most dreaded of 
diseases. But the question seemed not to be asked—what would it mean for society if people 
learn while perfectly healthy and functional that they will develop Alzheimer’s disease? What 
will it mean to live in a society where some people are carrying around the knowledge that 
they will certainly develop Alzheimer’s if death does not otherwise occur prematurely?  
 What is the responsibility of science communication as a practice or research field in 
conveying the successful efforts toward early, pre-symptomatic detection of dementia? What 
would this look like as a practical matter? Can we fairly expect of science communication to 
explore the world of implications of technological advances in disease detection? Consider the 
counterfactual. Consider a breakthrough technology that could identify conclusively that an 
individual at age 35 will develop dementia at age 55. While we might be fascinated and 
perhaps even herald this development on the basis of the early detection/better outcomes 
mantra, what would this mean more broadly? Would science communication fall short if only 
the biological and technological advances were discussed without consideration of possible or 
likely implications? The twin aims of social justice would require that science communication 
addressing advances in Alzheimer’s research also promote human well-being and combat 
adverse effects on well-being caused by systematic disadvantage. Since early detection is not 
yet accompanied by effective preventive measures or strategies, the possible promotion of 
well-being might be in providing peace of mind for those who worry, as well as the general 
argument in support of early detection, that people can plan while still cognitively healthy. But 
the second twin aim calls for the prevention/amelioration of harm to well-being caused by 
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systematic disadvantage. Early detection may not be an unqualified good. Consider one main 
group affected by systematic disadvantage, especially in this area of health—low SES status. 
This group includes low education, income, access, socio-economic status and all of the 
disadvantages that attend this circumstance, often accumulating and compounding. What will 
the implications be for the ability to get health insurance? What will such knowledge mean for 
job prospects and maintaining or securing employment? Furthermore, will availability of early 
detection technology shift into routine intake or screening both inside and outside of the 
biomedical field? What obligations will a person of low SES have with regard to disclosure 
and what will be the consequences of that exposure? Social justice would have us ask whether 
the practice and field of science communication can accommodate an expansion in scope to 
include regard for the implications of science. 
3.4 Inherent Tension? 
Would requirements to regard context, impact, and implication of science in the practice of 
science communication negatively affect the integrity of the field or compromise it in other 
important ways? Would attention to empowerment in the form of enhancing agency via 
engagement, awareness, or understanding impermissibly detract from the core business of 
science communication? Are there sound reasons why regard for any of these aspects (context, 
impact, or implications) of science could present insurmountable challenges to the integrity 
and credibility of science communication? Practical issues of how to identify the 
systematically disadvantaged or how to ascertain implications clearly arise, but are not 
unsolvable. While the science communicator may strive for truth, objectivity and neutrality, is 
the practice of her/his craft as an enterprise void of ostensible values made better by an 
omission to attend to the quality of lives and perpetuation of disadvantage and the attendant 
impact on well-being? In a chapter on risk communication, Allan Irwin (2008) refers to three 
orders of thinking in science communication—deficit, public engagement, and critical 
reflection about “the relationship between technical change, institutional priorities and wider 
conceptions of social welfare and justice”(p. 207). About this third order, he says  it “is not 
simply mechanics of science-public relations, but also to deeper questions such as the 
relationship between scientific governance, political economy and innovation strategy, and 
operation of national processes in globalized setting” (Irwin, 2008, p. 209). These, Irwin 
(2008) says, “raise issues that take us to the core of social and scientific progress in democratic 
societies” (p. 209). This third-order thinking would appear to open the door to the 
accommodation and embrace of such concepts as social justice in science communication. 
5. CONCLUSION 
I have explored the question of whether there is a role for social justice in science 
communication. While fairness is broadly applied across “goods,” social justice becomes a 
foundational concern when the target phenomenon is a “special good,” one that is essential to 
the capacity for human flourishing. One view of social justice consists of twin aims of 
improving well-being and combatting adverse effects on well-being caused by systematic 
disadvantage, thus ensuring that the cascade of disadvantage and adversity are not further 
compounded with regard to a “special good.” Does the goal of analyzing and critiquing in 
science communication allow room for a normative approach that prioritizes well-being, a 
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component of which is minimizing compounded disadvantage? It is not at all clear that social 
justice presents an inevitable conflict. In fact, this essay suggests that science communication 
may naturally embrace social justice beginning with heightened awareness of the concept.  
 To conclude, this analysis has shown not only that social justice may not necessarily be 
in conflict with science communication, but rather that aspects of social justice may actually sit 
in the heart of science communication to the extent that one of the shared goals is 
empowerment through scientific literacy. As a practical matter, it may be that social justice 
requires that the field and practice embrace a responsibility toward improving capacities for 
human flourishing and well-being, vigilant to and seizing opportunities to empower and 
promote agency and actively preventing or ameliorating harm to well-being of those already 
disadvantaged. The science communicator is vigilant by definition—to accuracy, truth, effect, 
and affect. What social justice requires of the science communicator arguably rests 
comfortably among these priorities—a vigilance to factors that compound and reinforce 
insufficiencies across multiple dimensions of well-being (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 36). Such a 
value, if taken as an underlying core value of the practice, could justify a regard for the ability 
of science communication to attend to issues of voice and access.  
 Does this present a challenge regarding objectivity whether regard for social justice is 
inconsistent with embrace of a normative approach? First, the underlying principle of social 
justice is one of fairness in practice; the concept is applied to society with the aim of improving 
human well-being and ensuring that the worse off are not further disempowered through lack 
of access and voice in the context of scientific developments or interaction. In telling the story 
of Henrietta Lacks, Rebecca Skloot (2011) has not detracted from the objectivity or credibility 
of field of science communication. She has, however, arguably engaged in an act of social 
justice by attending to issues of voice and access that in turn contribute both to well-being and 
the prevention of compounded disadvantage and, furthermore, arguably serves as an act of 
empowerment to her readers. Secondly, it is difficult to think of science communication 
circumventing social justice and doing so effectively. Social justice actually sits in the heart of 
science communication. Why care about the relationship between science and society 
(awareness, engagement, interest, opinion-forming, understanding) if not for the purpose of 
improving well-being and empowerment? Science communication, in practice and as a field of 
research, often regards context.  Is there a role for social justice in science communication? 
This essay proposes that it may be time to embrace this aspect of science communication, and 
emphatically declares that it is time for the field to engage with this question.  
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